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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Shawn O'Shay Davis II appeals from the restitution order entered upon his 
plea of guilty to grand theft by possession. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Davis bought an off-road motorcycle valued at up to $4000 for a down-
payment of $150 and an agreement to pay $450 more. (PSI, pp.2-3; 2/21/12 Tr., 
p.48, Ls.2-4.) Believing the bike was stolen, Davis made a number of changes to 
the bike to alter its appearance and then sold it to another person for $700. 
(1/3/13 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.11, L.5.) The dirt bike was recovered and returned to its 
owner a week after it was stolen in an "almost unrecognizable" condition. 
(2/21/12 Tr., p.34, Ls.13-21.) The mechanical and body damage to the bike was 
estimated at $2,475.01. (2/21/12 Tr., p.49, Ls.11-12.) 
The state charged Davis with grand theft by possession of stolen property. 
(R., pp.29-30.) Davis pied guilty pursuant to a Rule 11 agreement (R., pp.38-41) 
and the court withheld judgment and placed Davis on probation for three years 
(R., pp.52-57; 1/17/12 Tr., p.24, Ls.11-22). 
Following a two-part restitution hearing, the court issued a written order 
granting the state's request for restitution to the victim in the amount of 
$2,475.01. (R., pp.95-100.) Davis timely appealed. (R., pp.102-105.) 
1 
ISSUE 
Davis states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred by awarding restitution for damages 
when Mr. Davis was not the cause of those damages? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Davis failed to show the district court abused its discretion in ordering 
Davis to pay restitution for the victim's economic losses which were an actual 
and proximate cause of Davis' criminal conduct? 
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ARGUMENT 
Davis Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering 
Him To Pav Restitution For The Victim's Economic Losses That Were Actually 
And Proximately Caused By Davis' Criminal Conduct 
A. Introduction 
The district court ordered Davis to pay the victim $2,475.01 in damages 
caused to the victim's bike. (R., p.100.) That amount reflects the amount 
necessary to restore the bike to its previous condition. (Id.) Davis does not 
contest the underlying amount, he instead argues "the restitution award was 
improper since he was not the cause of most of the damage to the dirt bike." 
(Appellant's brief, p.1.) 
Davis' argument is without merit. A review of the record and the 
applicable law supports the district court's determination that "the economic 
damages were sustained as a result of [Davis'] criminal conduct" (R., p.100) and, 
as such, Davis is responsible for restitution amount as ordered. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed 
to the trial court's discretion. State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211, 296 P.3d 412,417 
(Ct. App. 2013); State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750, 752 (Ct. App. 
201 O); State v. Card, 146 Idaho 111, 114, 190 P.3d 930, 933 (Ct. App. 2008). 
The trial court's factual findings in relation to restitution will not be disturbed if 
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 
P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 
(2011). 
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C. Substantial Evidence Supports The District Court's Finding That The 
Victim's Loss Was Caused By Davis' Criminal Conduct 
Idaho Code § 19-5304(2) authorizes a court to "order a defendant found 
guilty of any crime which results in an economic loss to the victim to make 
restitution to the victim." For purposes of Idaho's restitution statute, a "victim" 
includes any "person or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result 
of the defendant's criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(e)(i) (emphasis added). 
"Economic loss" includes, among other things, "the value of property taken, 
destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed ... and . . . medical expenses resulting 
from the criminal conduct." I.C. § 19-5304(1 )(a) (emphasis added). "Therefore, 
in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal connection 
between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries 
suffered by the victim." State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 
(2011); accord State v. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 212, 296 P.3d 412, 418 (Ct. App. 
2013); State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491, 494, 283 P.3d 808, 811 (Ct. App. 
2012); State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 391, 271 P.3d 1243, 1247 (Ct. App. 
2012). 
As recently reiterated by the Idaho Supreme Court, "causation consists of 
actual cause and true proximate cause." Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 
401 (citing State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374, 223 P.3d 750, 757 (2009)). 
The Court articulated the distinction between actual and proximate cause as 
follows: 
"Actual cause is the factual question of whether a particular event 
produced a particular consequence. [Lampien, 148 Idaho at 374, 
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223 P.3d at 757] (quoting [Cramer v. Slater, 146 Idaho 868, 875, 
204 P.3d 508, 515 (2009)]). The "but for" test is used in 
circumstances where there is only one actual cause or where two 
or more possible causes were not acting concurrently. Id. On the 
other hand, true proximate cause deals with "whether it was 
reasonably foreseeable that such harm would flow from the 
negligent conduct." Id. (quoting Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 
P.3d at 515). In analyzing proximate cause, this Court must 
determine whether the injury and manner of occurrence are so 
highly unusual "that a reasonable person, making an inventory of 
the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would 
not have reasonably expected the injury to occur." Id. (quoting 
Cramer, 146 Idaho at 875, 204 P.3d at 515). 
Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401. See also Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 392, 
271 P.3d at 1248. The determinations of actual cause and proximate cause are 
both factual questions. Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401; Cottrell, 152 
Idaho at 392, 271 P.3d at 1248. 
Applying the two-part causation inquiry to the facts before it, the Corbus 
Court upheld an award of restitution for injuries sustained by the victim when he 
jumped out of Corbus' vehicle in the course of a police chase. 150 Idaho at 602-
06, 401-05. Regarding actual cause, the Court found that, but for "Corbus' acts 
of driving recklessly and eluding police officers and then failing to stop in 
response to their overhead emergency lights," the victim "would not have needed 
to" jump from the vehicle. kl at 603, 249 P.3d at 402. The Court also found 
proximate cause existed because, based on the evidence that showed "Corbus 
had created an extremely dangerous situation for his passenger by driving at 
night, at excessive speeds, with no headlights on ... , it was reasonably 
foreseeable that his passenger would decide to jump from the vehicle to avoid a 
potentially serious car accident." !,g_. at 605, 249 P.3d at 404. 
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More recently, in Cottrell, supra, the Idaho Court of Appeals upheld an 
award of restitution to the police officer victim for a knee injury he sustained when 
he attempted to restrain Cottrell while Cottrell actively resisted and obstructed the 
officer's attempt to arrest him. 152 Idaho at 390-94, 271 P.3d at 1246-50. The 
Court concluded that actual cause was "satisfied because the evidence show[ed] 
it was Cottrell's acts of attempting to pull away from [the officer] during arrest that 
precipitated the need for [the officer] to gain control of Cottrell and, in so doing, 
twist his knee." ~ at 393, 271 P.3d at 1249 (footnote omitted). The Court also 
found proximate cause, reasoning it was reasonably foreseeable, based on 
Cottrell's repeated failures to obey the officer's requests and submit to arrest, 
"that Cottrell's conduct would elicit a physical response from [the officer], putting 
[the officer] in a position to injure his knee." ~ 
As in Corbus and Cottrell, a review of the evidence in this case supports 
the district court's award of restitution and, more specifically, its finding that the 
damage to the dirt bike was a result of Davis' criminal conduct. The district court, 
in awarding restitution, outlined the series of events leading to the damage to the 
victim's property: 
During the restitution hearing, the Defendant admitted that 
he pied guilty to Grand Theft by Possession of Stolen Property, in 
violation of I.C. § 18-2403(4) and § 18-2407(1 ). Additionally, the 
Defendant testified that he bought a motorcycle from Loyal Williams 
for one hundred fifty dollars ($150.00). Defendant also admitted to 
aesthetically altering the bike by spray painting the fenders, 
removing the decals, and taking off the arm guards. Defendant 
admitted that he altered the bike and subsequently sold it to Travis 
Kearl because he believed that due to the low price he purchased 
the bike, that it could be "hot" or stolen. 
(R., p.96.) 
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At a minimum this evidence shows were it not for Davis' act of buying 
changing bike's appearance to avoid being caught, and 
selling it to another for a profit, dirt bike would not have been in the 
hands of the individual who caused extensive damage. The bike would have 
instead remained with its owner who took exceptional care of it. (See generally, 
2/21/12 Tr., pp.33-42, p.46, L.21 - p.48, L.1.).) Actual cause is thus satisfied in 
this case. 
There is also substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court's 
finding that Davis' criminal conduct was the proximate cause of the damage to 
the dirt bike: 
Davis admitted that he suspected that the bike was "hot" or stolen, 
and therefore, intentionally altered the bike's appearance and then 
disposed of it by selling it to another individual because of that 
belief. It should be reasonably foreseeable to a person who 
deprives another of his property by knowingly receiving, retaining, 
and selling stolen property, that the property could be damaged in 
the chain of possession. 
(R., p.99.) Further, had the victim not recovered his dirt bike, Davis would have 
been responsible for the entire value of its replacement, some $3,500-$4,000. 
(2/21/12 Tr., p.33, L.23, p.48, Ls.2-4.) 
The law dictates that crime victims are entitled to restitution for economic 
losses that are actually and proximately caused by the defendant's criminal 
conduct. I.C. § 19-5304; Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 401. Because it 
was a reasonably foreseeable result that the stolen bike Davis disposed of would 
end up damaged, proximate cause has been established. 
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Substantial evidence supports the district court's finding that the damage 
to the dirt bike was a result of Davis' criminal conduct. Davis has failed to 
estabiish an abuse of discretion in the restitution award. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the order of restitution. 
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